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1 O’Meara’s  translation  and  commentary  of  Ennead 19  ( Sur  les Vertus)  is  a  short  and
elegant book: the style is sparse, the meaning limpid, and the thesis skilfully developed.
The translation meticulously follows the movement of Plotinus’ argumentation. Ample
cross  references  are  made  to  other  tractates,  and  helpful  mentions  abound  of
secondary literature in languages other than French. The historical sections are short:
Middle Platonist antecedents of Plotinus’ theory of virtue are occasionally mentioned
in footnotes and the influence of the tractate upon later Neoplatonists is succinctly
recorded.  Although O’Meara (henceforth O’M.)  focuses on a  subject  currently  much
debated amongst Plotinian scholars, he eschews polemics.
2 I now turn to specifics. To account for Plotinus’s articulation of the concept of virtue,
O’M. turns to A.C. Lloyd’s The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (1990). In the Neoplatonic frame
of procession and causation, Lloyd argues in a book that is more often lauded than
read,  « forms  are  not  transmitted  identically  from  agent  to  effect,  as  they  do  for
Aristotle,  but  are  altered  qualitatively  when  received  by  the  effect »  (77).  Since
members  of  such  a  series  (e.g.  good,  life,  soul)  do  not  possess  their  property
synonymously, Lloyd goes on, they form a quasi-genus or P-series. Borrowing Lloyd’s
key concept to make it applicable to the Plotinian hierarchy of the virtues, O’M. writes:
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« si ... cet ordre de priorité s’applique à la vertu, nous pouvons en conclure que ce qui
est commun aux deux types de vertus, ce qui fait que ce sont des ‘vertus’, n’est autre
que le premier terme de l’ordre, c’est-à-dire les vertus ‘supérieures’ » (p. 77). True, but
what makes some virtues superior to others is their closer relationship to the Forms in
Intellect, which are the realities or archetypes by reference to which Plotinus conceives
of the virtues in the human soul.
3 At the outset O’M. warns his reader not to expect to find in the tractate a theory of
virtue  or,  even less,  a  summary of  Plotinus’  ethics,  but  only  an  exploration of  the
Platonic ideal of homoiosis theio (assimilation to god, p. 14). This is a curious view to take
of a tractate in which Plotinus makes ethical mileage of one of his favourite Platonic
passages.  To  become  as  just  and  good  as  humanly possible,  Socrates  had  told
Theaetetus, we must turn away from earth to heaven and assimilate ourselves to the
divine.  In  tractate  19,  through  tidying  up  the  paradoxes  left  in  Plato’s  pithy
formulation, Plotinus outlines his own, metaphysically based, analysis of some of the
key concepts of Greek ethics, virtue, self-purification and assimilation to the divine.
Why is this not ethics?
4 From his Platonopolis (2003) onwards, O’M. has sought to correct what he regards as a
one-sided account of  Plotinus’  ethics according to which we are to turn away from
practical affairs so as revert to the higher realities from which our soul is emanated.
Against  the  weight  of  scholarly  opinion  so  far,  O’M.  claims  not  only  that  Plotinus
presents  the  practical  life  as  a  valuable  second  best  for  those  who  are  unable  to
contemplate, but also that such a life can proceed from a deliberate choice on the part
of those who are able to contemplate. « The soul who has ‘reached divine life’ », he
writes, «... may wish to ‘descend’ to return to the exercise of ‘political virtue’ » (2003:
43). Since all the passages that he chooses to substantiate his interpretation deal with
human interaction, we may infer that he takes ethics to be essentially concerned with
the claims that others have on the virtuous agent.
5 From that point of view, it would seem, prima facie, that tractate 19 has little claim to be
a treatise of ethics; even the civic virtue of justice is there presented as a disposition
that the soul has to itself. Accordingly, to demonstrate that Plotinus finds value in the
practical life, O’M. turns to tractate 28, chapter 44. Plotinus, so he claims, there holds
that the human soul’s « generous nature » prompts it to care for its conjoined body is a
manner similar to the way in which the World-Soul takes providential care of the world
of  sense (106).  « Generous » is  an odd choice of  word on O’M.’s  part,  both lexically
(which Plotinian word does it render?) and semantically (is the virtue of generosity not
a disposition deliberately to further the welfare of another?). As O’M. knows well, the
World-Soul does not « choose » to do what it does (see, e.g., III 8 4) and, as Plotinus
argues in tractate 19, it cannot be said to be virtuous. What we get in tractate 28.44,
O’M.  maintains,  is  a  discussion  of  real-life  choices,  which  any  audience,  past  and
present, would regard as sensible if not noble (gennaios): concern for the wellbeing of
the body (one’s own as well  as that of others),  ambition for political office and the
decision to marry and have children.  While this  is  true enough,  Plotinus’  examples
should be taken in their context, which is a discussion of the « bewitchment (goeteia) »
of the soul by appetites and passions. To the life of practical affairs, which is liable to be
so « enchanted », he opposes the contemplative life, which is governed by reason and is
thus  immune  to  enchantment.  To  account  for  the  force  that  leads  sentient  beings
actively to aim at the satisfaction of urges that nature has implanted in them, Plotinus
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borrows from the Stoics the concept of oikeiosis. Taken as proceeding from oikeiosis, the
above-mentioned practical  choices,  as Plotinus then appears reluctantly to concede,
may « perhaps appear sensible » (44.23). O’M. takes this apparent concession to validate
his interpretation: « Ici, le souci de la vie des autres et de sa propre vie s’opposerait au
suicide ... la vie en cause est donc la vie en corps. On peut aussi supposer que l’âme, dans
son souci du corps, se soucie aussi du bien-être (corporel) des autres. Dans le cadre d’un
tel engagement de l’âme, il se peut que, dans certaines circonstances, le désir sexuel ait sa
place, non pas comme puissance irrationnelle obsédante, mais dans la mesure où il est
maȋtrisé par l’âme dans le libre exercice de son jugement » (106-107, italics mine). As
suggested by  his  use  of  modal  verbs  and the  conditional  tense,  O’M.  has  stretched
Plotinus’s words to the limit of their semantic possibilities. 
6 Furthermore, the second half of the chapter shows that Plotinus, far from conceding
anything, is actually warning the human soul who « contents herself with the nobility
in practical actions, and chooses activity because [of being] deluded by its vestiges of
nobility »  (25-26)  that  it  is,  in  reality,  « bewitched »  by  failing  to  realise  that  the
« nobility » of which it prides herself is but a semblance of nobility and that human
souls who pursue « what is not good as if it was good » are « being ignorantly led where
they do not want to go. » (30-33). The same contrast is drawn in tractate 52 15.13-17
between men who are ruled by external circumstances, « as if enchanted, » and those
who  master  them.  Readers  interested  in  the  issue  would  benefit  from  Gurtler’s
balanced commentary on tractate 28 (Ennead IV.4.30-45 & IV.5:  Problems Concerning the
Soul, 2015: 206-217). 
7 As the  above-mentioned chapter  shows,  Plotinus  is  more  inclined  to  downplay  the
worthiness of the practical life than to celebrate it. Although he is far from regarding it
as inherently bad and does admit that circumstances in the world of sense may require
the virtuous to forsake contemplation in favour of practical action, he stresses that
such  circumstances  are  rare  and,  more  generally,  that  those  who  choose  to  bring
children into the world and devote themselves to a life in politics are choosing the
lesser path. Paradoxically, one of the few passages in which Plotinus encourages us to
cultivate the civic virtues is in tractate 19: « it is unreasonable (alogon) to suppose that
we are not made godlike in any way by the civic virtues, » he writes (1.23-24) since
these virtues « do genuinely set us in order and make us better by giving limit and
measure into all our experience. » As O’M. rightly comments (78-82), the civic virtues
are there presented as true virtues and claimed to fulfil a doubly valuable function.
They enable human souls to put measure into their passions and appetites and they
prepare the stronger souls amongst them to undertake the process of self-purification
that goes hand in hand with the cultivation of the purificatory virtues. 
8 If for that reason alone, tractate 19 would have a claim to being considered a treatise of
ethics. But there are other reasons. First is Plotinus’ doctrine of the perfectibility of the
human embodied soul: what motivates it to seek to purify itself? Can it succeed in doing
so and, if  it  can succeed, how is it  to proceed? Second is the analysis of traditional
categories and concepts of Greek ethics that Plotinus carries out in the tractate, namely
the distinction between civic and purificatory virtues, the mutual implication of the
virtues and the re-interpretation of Plato’s definitions of the virtues in the Phaedo and
the  Republic.  Why then challenge  Plotinus’  own assessment  of  the  content  of  what
became  tractate  19  as  the  description  of  « the  life  of  the  good  man »  (7.12-13)?
Admittedly,  as  Flamand  has  noted,  « l’éthique  de  Plotin  a  quelque  chose  de
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déconcertant pour le lecteur d’aujourd’hui » (Sur les Vertus, in Brisson et Pradeau eds,
2003: 419). Plotinus’ insistence on the supreme value of the life of contemplation may
well shock modern readers whose ethical sensibilities have been shaped by a different,
post-Augustinian, concept of virtue as essentially « other-regarding » but, if so, these
readers would be well advised to take Plotinus on his own terms. 
9 Despite the above objections, O’M.’s translation of, and commentary on, Ennead 19 has
much to recommend itself and will stimulate debates for a long time to come. The book
is well produced and free from typos and other blemishes. 
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